University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2015

The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses
Jonathan Masur
dangelolawlib+jonathanmasur@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jonathan Masur, "The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses" (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics No. 729, 2015).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 729
(2D SERIES)
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 536

THE USE AND MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES
Jonathan S. Masur

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
August 2015
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper
Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2640179

THE USE AND MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES
Jonathan S. Masur †

ABSTRACT
As the number of nine- and ten-figure verdicts continues to increase
it is impossible not to take notice: patents are becoming an ever bigger
business with more and more wealth at stake. At the center of that business
lie the damages that courts award at trial, and the ways in which courts go
about calculating those damages. Yet the legal standards meant to govern
patent damages are notoriously ambiguous and unhelpful. In the face of
these difficulties, courts have sought a market mechanism that would aid
them in calculating patent damages. The solution they have seized upon is
to use existing licenses, typically granted by the plaintiff to third parties, as
evidence of the proper measure of damages. But the use of existing licenses
to measure reasonable royalty damages creates three significant and distinct
problems: first, it relies upon private information available only to the
parties to the pre-existing licensing agreement; second, it is ineluctably
circular; and third, it creates incentives for the patent holder to distort the
value of the licenses it negotiates in order to mislead the court. The Article
describes and analyzes these three problems, and then turns to potential
solutions. It analyzes a variety of possible reforms, including selection of
particular licenses for comparison or the application of a multiplier to the
value of existing licenses. Though several of these solutions show promise,
none come close to being a complete answer. It may well be that courts
have no choice but to largely ignore existing licenses when calculating
patent damages, leaving them more at sea than ever.

INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the three largest jury verdicts handed down anywhere in the
United States came in patent cases. Carnegie Mellon won a $1.17 billion
verdict against Marvell Technology Group for infringing integrated circuit
†

John P. Wilson Professor of Law and David and Celia Hilliard Research Scholar,
University of Chicago Law School. I thank Michael Abramowicz, Tacy Flint, William H.J.
Hubbard, William R. Hubbard, Mark Lemley, Saul Levmore, Lisa Ouellette, and Eric
Posner for helpful comments and conversations, and John Yang and Jia Zhu for excellent
research assistance. This work was supported by the David and Celia Hilliard Fund.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2640179

2

MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES

24-Feb-15

patents; 1 Apple won a $1.05 billion judgment against Samsung for patents
related to its smartphones and tablets; 2 and Monsanto was awarded $1
billion in a lawsuit against DuPont over patents on genetically modified
soybeans. 3 Five other firms won damages verdicts in excess of $100
million.4 The following year, Pfizer avoided shattering the record for the
largest patent verdict in history by settling claims against two generic drug
manufacturers for $2.15 billion just as jury deliberations were about to
begin. 5 In between these headline-making numbers, dozens of plaintiffs
won verdicts in the millions or tens of millions of dollars, and many more
patent owners negotiated royalty agreements outside of litigation for
millions more. 6 After enough nine- and ten-figure verdicts it is impossible
not to take notice: patents are becoming an ever larger business with more
and more wealth at stake. At the center of that business lie the damages that

1

Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (W.D. Pa.
2013); Verdict and Settlement Summary, Carnegie Mellon University vs. Marvell
Technology Group Ltd. & Marvell Semiconductor Inc., 2012 WL 8262739 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
26, 2012) (No. 09-CV-00290).
2
Verdict and Settlement Summary, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2012 WL 4078433
(Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 11-CV-01846).
3
Monsanto Awarded $1 Billion in Patent Infringement Case Against Dupont, 19 No. 8
WJINTPROP 4 (Aug. 9, 2012); Verdict returned, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2012) (No. 09-CV-00686).
4
Verdict and Settlement Summary, VirnetX v. Cisco Sys., 2012 WL 7638169 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 6, 2012) (No. 10-CV-00417) ($368M); Jury Verdicts, General Electric Company v.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. and Mitsubishi Power Systems Americas, Inc., 2012 Jury
Verdicts LEXIS 2875 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) (No. 10-CV-00276) ($170M); Verdict and
Settlement Summary, Mformation Technologies Inc. v. Research In Motion Limited, 2012
WL 10864224 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) (No. 08-CV-04990) ($147M); Jury Verdicts,
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., 2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
18042 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. 10-CV-03428) ($112M); Jury Verdicts, WesternGeco
LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 14042 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16,
2012) (No. 09-CV-1827) ($106M).
5
Teva, Sun Pharma to Pay $2.15 Billion to Settle Pfizer Patent Suit, 20 No. 5
WJINTPROP 8 (Jun. 26, 2013)
6
Verdict and Settlement Summary, Shelbyzyme LLC v. Genzyme Corp., 2012 WL
5266437 (D. Del. Jul. 17, 2012) (No. 09-CV-00768) ($50M); Verdict and Settlement
Summary, Enzo Biochem v. Applera Corp., 2012 WL 6951353 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2012)
(No. 04-CV-00929) ($48.6M); Verdict and Settlement Summary, I/P Engine v. AOL Inc.,
2012 WL 10033892 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2012) (No. 11-CV-00512) ($30.5M); Verdict and
Settlement Summary, Pacific Bioscience Labs. v. Nutra Luxe, 2012 WL 8628035 (W.D.
Wa. Sept. 12, 2012) (No. 10-CV-00230) ($11.6M); Gene Quinn, Patent Business: Deals,
Acquisitions
&
Licenses
July
2012
(Jul.
20,
2012),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/07/20/patent-business-deals-acquisitions-licenses-july2012/id=26073/; Gene Quinn & Angel Krippner, Patent Deals, Licenses and Settlements –
December 2012 (Dec. 30, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/12/30/patent-dealslicenses-and-settlements-december-2012/id=30879/.
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courts award at trial and the ways in which courts go about calculating those
damages.
Part of the explanation for the heightened focus on monetary
damages in patent law is the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v.
MercExchange. 7 That decision made it more difficult for prevailing patent
plaintiffs to obtain injunctions. 8 One of the primary benefits of granting an
injunction was that it often freed the judge from having to calculate
damages independently, leaving that determination to the parties. 9 With
injunctions becoming less common in cases where a patent holder prevails,
the calculation of damages for patent liability has moved closer to center
stage. The result is renewed attention to damages calculations, from both
the courts 10 and the scholarly literature. 11
Nonetheless, courts’ efforts to calculate patent damages continue to
be plagued by a number of well-understood problems. In some instances,
the plaintiff and defendant are both practicing entities that produce
competing products. 12 In these cases, the judge or jury has the
7

547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Id. Prior to eBay, there was a presumption in favor of granting an injunction to a
prevailing plaintiff in a patent case. eBay held that the usual rules of equity applied and that
courts might only grant an injunction when a four-factor test favored doing so—which was
not always the case.
9
Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (noting that an injunction
clarifies the parties’ rights, allowing them to return to the bargaining table and negotiate
privately).
10
See, e.g., Apple v. Samsung, 2014 WL 549324 (denying Apple’s request for additur
following a second trial on damages); Apple v. Samsung, 2014 WL 6687122 (setting
ongoing royalty payments); Lucent v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 2013 WL 5593609; Apple, Inc. v. Motorola,
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J.); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757
F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
11
See, e.g., John C. Jarosz, Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and
Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769
(2013); Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages
Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192,
215 (2011); David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology,
49 GA. L. REV. 79 (2014); Stephen J. Conroy et. al., The Case for Admitting Settlement
License Agreements in A Reasonable Royalty Analysis, 46 LES NOUVELLES 291 (2011);
Jaimeson Fedell, A Step in the Right Direction: Patent Damages and the Elimination of the
Entire Market Value Rule, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1143 (2014); Layne S. Keele, Res"Q"Ing
Patent Infringement Damages After Resqnet: The Dangers of Litigation Licenses As
Evidence of A Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 205 (2012).
12
See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“In patent
infringement action in two-supplier market, lost profits damages may be in form of
diverted sales, eroded prices or increased expenses”); Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v.
Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (substantial
evidence existed for award of lost profits based on existence of two-supplier, high-end
8

4

MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES

24-Feb-15

comparatively easier task of determining damages by estimating lost profits:
how many additional sales would the plaintiff have made had the defendant
not infringed its patent? 13 Of course, one uses the word “easier” advisedly;
this task is far from simple. It can be tremendously difficult to determine
how many sales a patent holder lost because of the infringement, or if it lost
any at all. The patent may cover a feature that is largely irrelevant to
consumer decisions, or it may duplicate an equally attractive non-infringing
technology that the defendant could have employed instead. Thus,
determining lost profits requires a court to answer a complex counterfactual—how many units would the plaintiff have sold absent the
infringement—without reliable access to much of the relevant information.
Not surprisingly, the legal guidance provided by the courts of appeal—most
notably the Panduit factors, after the case by the same name 14—is
notoriously ambiguous and unhelpful.
However, in an increasing number of cases, the patent holder has no
lost profits, cannot prove lost profits, or simply does not wish to attempt to
do so. 15 In those cases, the patent plaintiff will instead seek a “reasonable
market.); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven though
competitor attempted to suggest that the market included numerous other noninfringing
alternatives to its device, patent owner provided evidence that no other non-infringing
alternatives were acceptable during the necessary time periods.”); Mark A. Lemley,
Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655
(2009) ("Courts interpreting this provision have divided patent damages into two groupslost profits, available to patent owners who would have made sales in the absence of
infringement, and reasonable royalties, a fallback remedy for everyone else.").
13
See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“In
determining the amount of damages to which King was entitled, the district court
considered: (1) the number of lost sales; (2) the gross receipts King would have obtained
from the lost sales had there been no infringement by Tapematic; (3) the cost of sales to be
deducted from gross receipts; and (4) King's profit on the lost sales.”); Versata Software,
Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Versata claimed this
consisted of 93 lost sales, and it put forward evidence regarding demand, the absence of
noninfringing alternatives, and the capacity to sell Pricer in this market.”); Micro Chem.,
Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To recover lost profits damages,
patentee must show that “but for” infringement it reasonably would have made additional
profits enjoyed by infringer.”).
14
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). The
four Panduit factors are “(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable
noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the
demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.” Id. at 1156.
15
In some but hardly all cases, this will occur because the patent owner is a non-practicing
entity that does not produce a product and thus has no profits to lose. See Christopher A.
Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs),
99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee
Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335 (2012). On other occasions, the
patent owner might simply believe that it is advantageous to pursue a reasonable royalty
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royalty,” which the court must determine. 16 Calculating lost profits is by no
means trivial, but it is substantially more determinate and straightforward
than estimating a reasonable royalty. To accomplish this latter task, a court
must attempt to reconstruct a hypothetical negotiation between patent
plaintiff and defendant—which likely never took place—and determine the
amount of money for which the two parties would have agreed to settle. 17
Worse still, the legal guidance provided to courts and juries is
almost comically counter-productive. When determining reasonable royalty
damages, courts are instructed to consider the fifteen influential GeorgiaPacific factors, 18 a laundry list of considerations that shed little light on the
appropriate dollar figures. The Federal Circuit has (correctly) struck down
more determinate types of guidance, such as the “25% rule of thumb,”
according to which 25% of the defendant’s profits should be paid to a patent
defendant as a reasonable royalty. 19 Similarly, it has (correctly) limited the
number of situations in which a court is permitted to calculate damages
using the “entire market value rule,” whereby a court would base a
reasonable royalty on the full price of the product being sold, rather than the
value of the particular patented component. 20 But the result has been to
leave courts almost entirely at sea and at the mercy of the parties’ experts
when attempting to assess damages. 21 In combination, the elimination of the
25% rule and the limits placed on the entire market value rule have left
courts guessing about both (1) the proper royalty rate, and (2) the sales
figure (the “royalty base”) to which it should apply that royalty rate. It is not
surprising, then, that courts have largely floundered when attempting to
estimate reasonable royalties.
instead. Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1661, 1676–77 (2010); see,
e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
16
The Patent Act allows plaintiffs to select among the two options. 35 U.S.C. § 284; Omri
Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2011).
17
See infra Part I.
18
These factors derive their name from Georgia-Pacific v. United States Plywood Corp.,
318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although Georgia-Pacific is merely a district court
case, the Federal Circuit has adopted it as the touchstone for computing reasonable royalty
damages.
19
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
20
VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed Cir. 2014). Courts may use the
entire market value rule only when “it can be shown that the patented feature drives the
demand for an entire multi-component product . . . .” LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67.
21
For instance, it is much easier to price an entire product—which is being sold in the
market—than a particular component of that product, which might never be sold on its own
for market value. See Brian D. Coggio, Damage Control-What an Adjudged Infringer Can
Do to Minimize the Resulting Damage, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 250, 296 (1987) (“However, the
relative difficulty of establishing apportionment will operate in favor of the application of
the entire market value rule.”).
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In the face of these difficulties, it is natural for courts to seek an
alternative means of estimating reasonable royalties. Again, one of the
principal disadvantages of the turn away from injunctive relief as a patent
remedy is that it robs courts of the opportunity to have the parties decide the
value of a patent through arms-length bargaining. An alternative market
mechanism that allows courts to use private valuations to accurately gauge
patent damages would be of obvious value. The solution that courts have
arrived at is to use existing licenses, typically granted by the plaintiff to
third parties, as evidence of the proper measure of damages. A patent
license offers the elusive holy grail: an arms-length transaction between two
private parties that places a monetary value on the patent. Indeed, the
measure of value provided by an existing license is the very first factor
listed by Georgia-Pacific for use in calculating reasonable royalty
damages. 22 Courts have relied upon existing licenses in calculating damages
for decades, 23 and the practice has grown even more prominent in recent
years. 24 At first blush this approach makes sense; if the courts must
reconstruct a hypothetical royalty negotiation, actual pre-existing royalty
agreements might well constitute the best available evidence of the contours
of such a negotiation. Not surprisingly, scholars, commentators, and courts
nearly unanimously bless the use of existing licenses to calculate patent
damages. 25
But the use of existing licenses to measure reasonable royalty
damages creates three significant and distinct problems. The first is that it
relies upon private information, available only to the parties to the first
licensing agreement, about the plaintiff’s probability of success in litigation.
Every agreement to license a patent is necessarily made in the shadow of
the threat of litigation. 26 If a patent holder had no means to enforce its
22

Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (“1. The royalties received by the patentee
for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.”).
23
Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
24
See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc., 767 F.3d at 1330–31; Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed Cir. 2012) (validating the
use of some licenses in determining damages and rejecting others); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure
Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1212 (Fed.Cir.2010); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
773 F.3d 1201; Waterton Polymer Products USA, LLC v. EdiZONE, LLC, 2014 WL
5782710 (D. Utah 2014); Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc'ns, Inc., No. 13-CV-346-BBC,
2014 WL 5080411 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 9, 2014); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
899 F. Supp. 2d 971 (S.D. Cal. 2012); ReedHycalog, UK, Ltd. v. Diamond Innovations
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Tex. 2010); Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No.
CIV.A. 2:06-CV-72 DF, 2010 WL 903259, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2010); Spreadsheet
Automation Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 587 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
25
See sources cited in supra note 11.
26
See infra Part II.A.
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patent, no licensee would pay royalties for a license. Accordingly, any
negotiation over royalties will necessarily be based upon the outcome the
parties expected should the case go to trial. 27 The parties will have to
account for the possibility that courts will find the patent invalid or not
infringed—the possibility, that is, that the licensee will not be forced to pay
anything.
This highlights the second, closely related problem with using
existing licenses to calculate reasonable royalty damages: the procedure is
ineluctably circular. 28 Licensing agreements are based upon expected
damages awards at trial. But if damages awarded at trial are in turn based
upon licensing agreements, it creates an unconquerable chicken-and-egg
problem. Judicial error with regard to the appropriate measure of damages
will produce smaller royalty amounts outside of litigation, which will in
turn lead to lower judicial calculations of damages, which will then beget
even smaller royalty payments outside of litigation, and so forth.
The third problem stemming from the use of existing licenses is
common to any setting in which a contract between two parties, A and B,
will affect the rights of a third party, C. A and B will always have an
incentive to distort their contract so as to maximize their joint gains against
C. 29 For instance, suppose that a patent owner P understands that the
licensing agreement it reaches with a licensee L1 will affect the damages it
obtains in litigation against a second subsequent licensee, L2, or the royalty
it can negotiate with a third subsequent licensee, L3. P has a strong incentive
to inflate the value of its agreement with L1, perhaps in exchange for
providing L1 with something else of value. Courts have to be vigilant in
policing licensing agreements for extraneous considerations before using
those agreements to estimate damages. At the same time, if courts are too
particular in requiring that an agreement include nothing but a license to use
a patented technology, they may find few existing licenses that can serve as
sound bases for calculating damages.
In light of these problems, the question is what role existing licenses
should play in judicial damages calculations. It would seem counterproductive to throw away information about patent valuations when such
information is so scarce to begin with. But without some means of
accounting for the context within which parties negotiate licenses, there is
doubt as to whether existing licenses can provide reliable evidence of
27

See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1992, 1993 (2007); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L.
& ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); see also John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973).
28
See infra Part II.B.
29
See infra Part II.C.
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reasonable royalty damages. The final Part considers a variety of potential
solutions to these problems. Though several of these solutions show
promise, none comes close to being a complete answer. It may well be that
courts have no choice but to treat existing licenses as providing only the
most limited of guidance when calculating damages at trial.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the courts’
practice of using existing licenses to gauge reasonable royalty patent
damages and outlines the rules that courts have developed to guide that
practice. Part II analyzes the three problems inherent to using existing
licenses to calculate reasonable royalties: courts’ inability to access the
private information that will unlock the license; the circularity involved in
relying upon existing licenses in damages calculations; and the incentives to
distort contracts when a contract between two parties is used to value
property or legal rights in a manner that affects a third party. Part III
considers a variety of potential mechanisms for solving these problems but
concludes that the difficulties they create cannot be entirely ameliorated.
The Article closes with an inquiry into whether there remains any viable
role for existing licenses in the setting of reasonable royalty damages at
trial.

I.

LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND REASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES

When a patent plaintiff prevails at trial but cannot prove lost profits
or damages—or does not wish to try—the adjudicating court must instead
determine the reasonable royalty that an infringer should have paid the
patent holder to license the patent. 30 The court must imagine a hypothetical
negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant, conducted at the
moment before the defendant’s infringement began, 31 and determine the
royalty the two parties would have settled upon after bargaining at arm’s
length. The court must further assume, for purposes of this hypothetical
negotiation, that both parties know the patent to be valid and infringed—as
the court has just found it to be. 32 This inquiry is both hypothetical and well
30

35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty . . . .”).
31
See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1363–64
(Fed.Cir.2006) ( “[T]he hypothetical negotiation relates to the date of first infringement.”);
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor–Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“The
determination of a reasonable royalty . . . [is based] on what a willing licensor and licensee
would bargain for at hypothetical negotiations on the date infringement started.”).
32
Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1301; see also Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent
Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691, 722–23 (1993).

17-June-15
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after the fact, and it requires the court to forget many facts that it has
learned and imagine many others that it cannot know. 33 It is naturally
fraught with both error and complication. 34 The Federal Circuit 35 has
compounded the situation by providing only amorphous guidance to the
lower courts. Courts awarding a reasonable royalty are instructed to apply
the fifteen-part test enumerated in Georgia Pacific. 36 Almost needless to
say, lower courts have found this to be anything but a straightforward
task. 37
It is thus not surprising that courts have grasped for sources of
market information, believing them superior to the court’s own speculation
and hypothesizing. Georgia-Pacific itself encourages this; the very first
Georgia-Pacific factor is “[t]he royalties received by the patentee for the
licensing of the patent in suit,” 38 and the second is “the rates paid by the
licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.” 39
Existing licenses—whether granted by the plaintiff for access to the patent
technology, or purchased by the defendant for similar technologies—are
thus front and center in reasonable royalty calculations.
But this does not mean that all licenses are treated equally. Federal
courts have evolved a set of rules to determine whether an existing license
will be admitted into evidence and, if admitted, what weight it will be
afforded. 40 First and foremost is the sensible rule that the existing license in
33
The difficulties that courts encounter in trying to reconstruct this hypothetical negotiation
are further detailed in Parts II and III.
34
See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Determining
a fair and reasonable royalty is often . . . a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to involve
more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.”); see also Merritt J. Hasbrouck,
Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent
Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 193 (2011) (“Although
the courts have made some progress in other areas of patent law, one troublesome area
remains: the appropriate standard for determining a reasonable royalty damages amount.”).
35
The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction from final decisions of district
courts in the area of patent law. 28 U.S.C § 1295(a).
36
Georgia-Pacific v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
37
See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“This
is a formidable list . . . . And could a judge or a jury really balance 15 or more factors and
come up with anything resembling an objective assessment?”); see also Bo Zeng, Lucent v.
Gateway: Putting the "Reasonable" Back into Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 329, 333 (2011) (“In essence, Georgia-Pacific's hypothetical, individually-negotiated
approach complicated reasonable royalty determinations . . . .”).
38
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
39
Id.
40
See Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable Royalty Damages,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 668–69 (2014) (“Although reasonable arguments could be
made for each of these factors to be the starting point in determining a royalty rate, the

10

MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES

24-Feb-15

question must involve a patent very similar (if not identical) to the patent in
suit. 41 A comparison is not valuable if it is not apples-to-apples, or close to
it. Thus, existing licenses that bundle together multiple patents, or a patent
and something else of value (such as a trademark or trade secret), are
typically not accepted as valid comparisons. 42 Similarly, courts disfavor
licenses for unrelated technology, on the theory that they may be more or
less valuable than the technology in the patent at suit. 43 In addition, courts
generally frown upon the use of one type of license—for instance, a lump
sum license—to calculate a different type of license, such as a running
royalty in which the defendant pays per unit sold over time. 44 In practice,
this means that licenses granted by the patent owner for the same patent are
more commonly used in calculating damages than licenses taken by the
defendant on similar technologies. 45
Federal Circuit has increased the level of scrutiny in assessing whether licenses are truly
‘comparable.’”).
41
See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“damages award cannot stand solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a
recitation of royalty numbers . . . particularly when it is doubtful that the technology of
those license agreements is in any way similar to the technology being litigated here.”); see
also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 79 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“When relying on licenses to prove a reasonable royalty, alleging a loose or vague
comparability between different technologies or licenses does not suffice . . . . We insisted
that the ‘licenses relied upon by the patentee in proving damages [be] sufficiently
comparable to the hypothetical license at issue in suit.’”) (quoting Lucent Technologies,
Inc., 580 F.3d at 1325).
42
See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In sum, the
district court erred by considering ResQNet's re-bundling licenses to significantly adjust
upward the reasonable royalty without any factual findings that accounted for the
technological and economic differences between those licenses and the ′075 patent.”); see
also John Elmore, The Technological Comparability of Patent License Agreements, 46 LES
NOUVELLES 115, 116 (2011) (“[C]ase law cautions that patent license agreements
providing substantial non-patent benefits or multiple patents may not be comparable to a
“straight” patent license.”).
43
See ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869 (“This court has long required district courts
performing reasonable royalty calculations to exercise vigilance when considering past
licenses to technologies other than the patent in suit . . . . Any evidence unrelated to the
claimed invention does not support compensation for infringement but punishes beyond the
reach of the statute.”); see also Zeng, supra note 37, at 356 (“The Federal Circuit has
eliminated unrelated past licenses from consideration in patent damage analyses and should
do so because every licensing agreement is unique.”).
44
See, e.g., ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Va. 2011).
45
See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 748 (2011)
(“Strictly speaking, then, for a license to be economically comparable it should relate to the
same patent or patents at issue”); Roy Weinstein et. al., Taming Complex Intellectual
Property Compensation Problems, 22 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 547, 553 (2013) (“In view of
ResQNet and Lucent, comparable licenses can only include licenses to the patent-in-suit
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Second, and more important for present purposes, courts 46 and
commentators 47 generally disfavor licenses that parties negotiated as
settlements to ongoing litigation. Courts have reasoned that litigation
distorts the licensing prices that defendants are willing to pay, skewing
prices upward. 48 According to these courts, the primary cause of this
distortion is the cost of litigating: in order to avoid litigation costs, patent
defendants might be willing to pay more than they otherwise would to settle
a dispute and license a patent. 49 For many years, courts flatly refused to
consider any settlement under threat of litigation as reliable evidence of a
patent’s value, 50 or at minimum the courts greatly discounted the probative
value of such a license. 51 Those types of settlements were often barred from
itself, essentially removing from consideration licenses contemplated under GeorgiaPacific Factors 2 and 12.”).
46
See, e.g., Tights, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 442 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
47
See, e.g., Keele, supra note 11, at 216 (arguing that licenses negotiated during litigation
settlement are highly prejudicial and rarely probative); Tejas N. Narechania & Jackson
Taylor Kirklin, An Unsettling Development: The Use of Settlement-Related Evidence for
Damages Determinations in Patent Litigation, 2012 J. LAW, TECH & POL’Y 1 (2012)
(arguing that courts should bar all evidence related to settlement of litigation disputes). A
few scholars have argued that licenses negotiated as settlements to litigation should be
allowed into evidence when assessing damages, though this remains a minority viewpoint.
See Conroy et al., supra note 11; Michael Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in
Reasonable Royalty Determinations, 49 IDEA: The Intellectual Property Law Review 313
(2009).
48
Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp.
1354, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“[P]eople may settle patent litigation to reduce the costs of the
legal process. The terms of a settlement reflect these costs as well as the parties' estimates
about the probable outcome on the merits if the case proceeds . . . .”); Keele, supra note 11,
at 205–06 (noting the effect of litigation costs on settlement value).
49
Lumen View Tech., LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc., 24 F. Supp.3d 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
May 30, 2014) (“Lumen's motivation in this litigation was to extract a nuisance settlement
from FTB on the theory that FTB would rather pay an unjustified license fee than bear the
costs of the threatened expensive litigation.”); Steering Committee Report, 1989 DUKE L.J.
811, 823 (1989) (“[T]he threat of unreimbursable litigation costs can give weak claims a
nuisance settlement value they do not deserve.”); J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and
Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 388, 397 (2006) (“Patent trolls typically demand
licenses that are significantly less than the expected cost that each target company will
incur in litigation. Thus, many target companies opt for the economically efficient path and
pay a license fee to the patent troll rather than incur litigation costs.”).
50
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408; Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889) (“[A] payment
of any sum in settlement of a claim for an alleged infringement cannot be taken as a
standard to measure the value of the improvements patented, in determining the damages
sustained by the owners of the patent in other cases of infringement.”); PATENT LAW
DAMAGES & PRACTICE § 3.17 (2014).
51
See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“[A]s the White license was negotiated against a backdrop of continuing litigation and [the
defendant's] infringement of the Schreiner patent, the district court could properly discount
the probative value of the White license with regard to a reasonable royalty.”).
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evidence. However, in the 2010 case ResQNet v. Lansa, 52 the Federal
Circuit appeared to invite consideration of licenses negotiated as settlements
to litigation, though they would be awarded less evidentiary weight. 53 Since
2010, courts have occasionally considered licenses negotiated during
litigation as indicators of patent value. 54 By and large, however, courts have
continued to express a strong preference for licenses negotiated “in the
wild”—outside of litigation. 55 These licenses form the bulk of sources to
which courts have turned for guidance in setting reasonable royalty
damages. 56
LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer provides an illustrative
example. 57 There, the parties introduced into evidence twenty-nine prior
licenses of the patent in suit. 58 On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the
“vast majority” of these twenty-nine licenses had been negotiated outside of
litigation, and that those licenses provided the most reliable evidence of the
true value of the patent. 59 The court then singled out for disapprobation a
license negotiated by a firm named BenQ that had arisen under unusual
circumstances:
This settlement agreement was executed within two weeks of the
anticipated trial against BenQ. . . . By the time of the settlement,
BenQ had been repeatedly sanctioned by the district court for
discovery misconduct and misrepresentation. The district court had
52

ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 870–71.
54
E.g., Volumetrics Med. Imaging, LLC v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. 1:05CV955,
2011 WL 2470460, at *14 (M.D.N.C. June 20, 2011); Small v. Nobel Biocare USA, LLC,
808 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Automated Merch. Sys. Inc. v. Crane Co., 279
F.R.D. 366, 373 (N.D. W. Va. 2011).
55
E.g., Ravo v. Covidien LP, No. CIV.A. 11-1637, 2014 WL 5439787, at *7 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 24, 2014) (“Settlement agreements are generally not relevant ‘because in the usual
course they do not provide an accurate reflection of what a willing licensor would do in an
arm's length transaction.’”) (citing LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, 694 F.3d 51, 77–
78 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-CIV-23309, 2014 WL
5741870, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2014) (refusing to consider a license negotiated during
litigation); Sentius Int'l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-CV-00825-PSG, 2015 WL
451950, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (same). Commentators, even those who have
advocated giving non-zero weight to litigation settlements, have expressed similar
preferences for non-litigation licenses. See Conroy et al., supra note 11, at 302 (suggesting
that licenses negotiated as settlements to litigation should be admitted but arguing that they
are less probative than licenses negotiated outside of litigation); Taylor, supra note 11, at
114 (same); Keele, supra note 11, at 207 (same).
56
Yang, supra note 40, at 669.
57
694 F.3d 51 (2012).
58
Id. at 78.
59
Id.
53
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allotted BenQ one-third less time than [the patent owner] for voir
dire, opening statement, and closing argument, had awarded
attorneys' fees to [the patent owner] for bringing the sanctions
motion, had stricken one of BenQ's pleaded defenses, and had
sanctioned BenQ $500,000.00 as an additional punitive and
deterrent measure. 60
Perhaps not surprisingly, BenQ agreed to license the patent for a great deal
more money than any of the other licensees. BenQ paid $6 million, while
none of the other licenses exceeded $1 million. 61 The Federal Circuit held
that the district court had abused its discretion in admitting the BenQ
license into evidence. 62 It declared that the “unique coercive circumstances”
surrounding this license made it a particularly unreliable gauge of the
patent’s value. 63
There can be little doubt that BenQ’s setbacks in its litigation
against LaserDynamics (the patent owner) contributed to its larger licensing
figure. Had BenQ not been embroiled in litigation against LaserDynamics,
and had it not been faring so poorly, it would very likely have settled for
much less—probably $1 million or less, in line with the other licensees.
Nonetheless, I wish to suggest that the Federal Circuit had it exactly
backwards: the BenQ license, and not the other twenty-eight licenses, was
the most accurate indication of the “true” value of the patent. The court
should have admitted the BenQ license and excluded the others, or at least
afforded them little weight. More generally, courts’ approach to using
existing licenses to determine patent damages at trial is both incoherent and
backwards—a rare combination. Courts misunderstand patent licenses at
their foundation and in so doing have devised doctrines that are not merely
misguided, but counterproductive. The next Part explains how courts have
gone astray, and the final Part investigates what might be done to correct
them.

II.
A.

THREE BARRIERS TO USING EXISTING LICENSES

Existing Licenses and Private Information

No one would ever license a patent absent the threat of litigation. If
a patent holder could not threaten to enforce its patent against a putative
60

Id. at 58.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 78.
61
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licensee in court, the licensee would have no reason to negotiate a license in
the first place. 64 Patent licenses are best understood as civil settlements in
anticipation of possible litigation. 65
Accordingly, the licensing fee for a given patent will depend upon
the parties’ expected outcomes at trial. 66 That is not to say that licensing
amounts are driven only by expected trial outcomes. The cost of going to
trial will factor into the parties’ calculations as well, and thus in some cases
patent holders may be able to obtain licensing fees greater than the expected
outcome at trial. 67 But expected trial outcomes will necessarily play a
significant role. To win at trial, the plaintiff has to show both that the patent
is valid and that the defendant infringed the patent. Thus the set of potential
trial outcomes includes the possibility that the patent will be found invalid,
or that the court will find that the defendant did not infringe the patent, and
thus that there will be no award of damages. 68 In formal terms, the
plaintiff’s expected outcome at trial is p × d – c, where p is the probability
that the patent will be held valid and enforced, d is the likely amount of
damages the court will assess, and c is the cost of litigation. Conversely, the
defendant’s expected payout is p × d + c. The plaintiff will be willing to
grant a license—that is, settle—for any amount greater than p × d – c, while
the defendant will be willing to purchase a license for any amount less than
p × d + c. Accordingly, if the two parties are able to agree upon a license, it

64

Keele, supra note 11, at 205 (“Royalties are usually paid to avoid litigation--most people
who thought that they could infringe a patent with impunity would likely do so.”); Dov
Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole
System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 311, 388 (2009) (“…with no potential enforcement by the owner of the IP,
potential licensees may see no incentive to ever license the patent; infringing at will.”);
Brian Fung, The Man Who Invented Priceline.com Wants to Shake Up America’s Approach
POST,
Jan.
2,
2015,
available
at
to
Patents,
WASHINGTON
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/01/02/the-man-who-inventedpriceline-com-wants-to-shake-up-americas-patents/ (“I learned very quickly that nobody
wanted to license my solutions unless I threatened to sue them—and in most cases, when I
actually sued them . . . .”).
65
See infra Part II.B (explaining that there is no reason to license a patent other than to
avoid litigation); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1992, 1993 (2007) (analyzing licenses as litigation settlements).
66
Keele, supra note 11, at 205–06.
67
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 2000–09 (analyzing mechanisms that can drive
licensing prices upward).
68
Id. (“Like any other settlement, the amount a party is willing to pay or accept for a
litigation license . . . generally consists of three core components: the likelihood of liability
. . . ; the expectation value of the damages . . . ; and the party's expected litigation costs . . .
.”).
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will be for a royalty R such that p × d – c < R < p × d + c. 69 The midpoint of
that range is p × d, and thus the parties should be expected to agree upon a
royalty in the vicinity of p × d: R ≈ p × d.
By way of example, imagine that a patent holder (P) and a putative
licensee (L1) are negotiating a license over a particular piece of patented
technology. Suppose the parties recognize that a court is only 25% likely to
hold the patent valid and infringed by L1. Suppose further that the parties
agree that if the patent is found valid and infringed, the court is likely to
assess $20 million in reasonable royalty damages. Finally, suppose that the
patent litigation will cost each party $2 million. The patent holder’s
expected outcome from trial is $20 million × 25% – $2 million = $3 million.
The putative licensee’s expected trial outcome is –$20 million × 25% – $2
million = –$7 million. P would be willing to grant a license for any amount
greater than $3 million; L1 would be willing to pay anything less than $7
million. The parties should be expected to negotiate a reasonable royalty
near the midpoint of those two figures: approximately $5 million. 70 The
license that the parties eventually negotiate will be driven by the expected
damages at trial as well as the likelihood that the patent will be found valid
and infringed in the first instance. 71
Now imagine that P sues a second putative infringer (or licensee) L2
for infringing the same patent. The case goes to trial, and P wins: the court
holds that the patent is valid and has been infringed by L2. In order to
determine damages, the court is expected to assess the outcome of a
hypothetical negotiation between P and L2 in which the parties agree upon a
reasonable royalty. Under governing Federal Circuit law, the court must
assume that this hypothetical negotiation took place immediately before the
moment of infringement—before L2 began its infringing activities. 72
Critically, however, the court must also assume that the patent is valid and
infringed and that both parties know it to be valid and infringed. 73 In that
sense, the trial has officially resolved any ambiguity or uncertainty that
69

Landes, supra note 27, at 67 (analyzing a model of settlement in which litigation costs
create bargaining space within which parties can settle); Posner, supra note 27, at 414
(same).
70
Posner, supra note 27, at 414 (analyzing this dynamic).
71
See Taylor, supra note 11, at 115 (“Negotiated royalties thus include discounts based on
risk borne by the patent owner associated with proving liability, relief, and enforceability . .
. .”).
72
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach,
attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they
successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began.”).
73
Id. at 1325 (“The hypothetical negotiation also assumes that the asserted patent claims
are valid and infringed.”); see also LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, 694 F.3d 51, 77
(2012) (“. . . validity and infringement of the patent not being disputed.”).
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previously surrounded the patent. As a matter of law, P has prevailed over
L2, with all of the attendant consequences. 74
The court is thus faced with the task of reconstructing the price that
L2 would have paid to license the patent from P if both parties had agreed
that the patent was valid and infringed. It is natural for a court to look to the
existing license between P and L1 for guidance. But when that license was
negotiated, the parties could not have been certain that the patent was valid
and infringed—or, at minimum, there is no way for a court to know whether
P and L1 believed that the patent was valid and infringed and no reason to
believe that they viewed it as a certainty. That is private information,
inaccessible to the court. P and L1 might have believed that it was 100%
likely or nearly 100% likely that the patent was valid and infringed; or they
might have believed it to be 50% likely, or 25% likely, as in this
hypothetical.
Accordingly, the court should not simply use the licensing figure
from the agreement between P and L1—$5 million—when calculating
damages in the P v. L2 litigation. The parties negotiated the $5 million
royalty with the understanding that there was some (likely non-zero)
probability that the patent would not be found valid and infringed. Now that
P has prevailed in its suit against L2, that probabilistic inquiry has been
resolved in favor of P, and the court is expected to assess damages as if the
parties were negotiating under the belief that the patent was valid and
infringed. If the court is to use the license between P and L1 as evidence of
damages in the litigation against L2, it must determine the fee P and L1
would have agreed upon had they believed that the patent was 100% likely
to be valid and infringed.
But the court cannot determine this hypothetical licensing fee
without knowing what P and L1 believed were their probabilities of success
at trial. That is, the court is attempting to determine d—the parties’ view of
74

Most scholars and practitioners of patent law understand that patents are probabilistic
entities through and through. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J.
ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005) (summarizing and analyzing this mode of thinking about patents).
Patents that are valid with 100% certainty or infringed by a given technology with 100%
certainty are like the Loch Ness Monster: various people claim to have seen them, but most
informed parties realize that they cannot possibly exist. Most patent scholars would say the
same thing about even patents that have been adjudicated. Just because one court (or jury)
has found a patent valid and infringed is not a necessary guarantee that a different court or
jury would have reached the same result. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?
An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 223 (2008) (demonstrating that even very experienced trial courts have their patent
decisions overruled at a high rate). Nonetheless, it is inherent to a court’s self-image and
the very nature of a trial that the law would view the decision of a court as final and
determinative—at least with respect to the parties and issues involved in that case—and
would treat it as eliminating any ambiguity accompanying the legal questions presented.

17-June-15

MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES

17

what damages a court would assess if the patent were found valid and
infringed—by observing R, the actual royalty that the parties negotiated.
But d is not the same as R; the negotiated royalty R would normally be
approximately p × d, where p is the probability that the patent will be found
valid and infringed. By simple rearrangement, d ≈ R / p. That is to say, a
court cannot use an existing royalty (R) to determine what damages it
should assess (d) without knowing p, the probability of success that the
parties assigned to the patent. 75 And there is almost no way for the court to
reliably determine p, absent unusual circumstances (to be discussed later).
The expected probability of success on the merits, p, is the parties’ private
information, unknowable to the court. There is no way for the court to
determine what probabilities P and L1 assigned to the patent litigation
merely from scrutinizing the licensing agreement. The court can hardly
force representatives of the two sides to testify to their internal perceptions
of the patent at the time of the settlement. 76 And without that information
the court cannot use the existing license to reliably estimate the value of the
patent. All it can know is that P and L1 valued the patent—if valid and
infringed—at no less than $5 million. The existing license thus provides a
floor for valuing the patent, not a reasonable estimate.
It is easy to see that the court would err if it simply assessed
damages against L2 equal to the amount of the prior license—here, $5
million.77 Consider, for example, a subsequent putative infringer, L3, who is
accused of infringement by P. L3 would understand that if it chose to litigate
against P and lost, it would likely face damages of $5 million—the amount
of the licensing agreement between P and L1. Outside of litigation, it would
be willing to pay P a royalty equal to $5 million, discounted by the
probability that P will win at trial. Imagine that P’s probability of success in
75

Of course, it is entirely possible that the two parties involved in a license—P and L1—did
not actually agree on the probability that the patent was valid and infringed. P might have
thought that the patent was 50% likely to be valid and infringed and believed that a court
would award it $10 million if it prevailed at trial, while L1 might have believed that the
patent was only 25% likely to be valid and infringed but anticipated a $20 million verdict if
P prevailed. The two parties would have arrived at the same licensing figure through
different routes. (If they arrive at different licensing figures, with P’s substantially higher,
then they will not be able to negotiate a license and will end up in litigation.)
If this is the case, then the existing license is an even less valuable guide to the
damages calculation. Instead of it being difficult or impossible for the court to determine
the parties’ joint belief about the proper amount of damages, there is no joint belief. The
court might as well ignore the license. In this respect, the analysis that follows stacks the
deck in favor of using existing licenses to assess patent damages. If this analysis
nonetheless compels the conclusion that existing licenses are not reliable guides to patent
damages, it will not be for lack of having granted those licenses the benefit of the doubt.
76
This point is developed further in infra Part III.B.
77
Contra Cotter, supra note 45, at 752-53 (2011) (arguing precisely the opposite).
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a suit against L3 is still only 25%. (The litigation between P and L2 might
have established that the patent is almost certainly valid, but L3’s product
might not infringe. 78) In this case, L3’s expected outcome, should it go to
trial, is only $5 million × 25% = $1.25 million. P and L3 will likely settle for
approximately that amount. This stands in stark contrast to the $5 million
license that P negotiated with L1. The only thing that has changed to drive
down the licensing price of the patent is the court’s misinterpretation of the
licensing agreement between P and L1. 79
Stated more formally, P and L1 negotiated a royalty R where R ≈ d ×
p. Then, the court in P v. L2 litigation erred by awarding damages in the
amount of R, rather than attempting to determine d. Now, L3 recognizes that
if it loses at trial, it will only be forced to pay d × p. Accordingly, it is only
willing to settle for (d × p) × p, or d × p2. The court’s failure to understand
that prior licenses are discounted by the probability of success at trial, and
its use of such licenses as guidelines for subsequent damages awards,
artificially reduces the value of the patent and the royalties that patent
holders will receive. 80
B.

Circularity

The preceding analysis should make clear that the use of past
licenses to determine patent damages is plagued by a fundamental problem
of circularity. Licenses are necessarily negotiated in the shadow of trial: the
royalty depends upon the parties’ expected outcomes at trial. 81 When courts
use existing licenses to determine damages at trial, the tiger is chasing its
78

The fact that a patent has been judged valid in one trial does not necessarily mean that it
must or will be judged valid in another. Under the doctrine of non-mutual collateral
estoppel, a patent plaintiff’s judgment against one party is not binding against a different
party who was not involved in the initial case. Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745
F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Holding that an earlier determination of patent validity had
no stare decisis effect); Timothy Denny Greene, ‘All Substantial Rights’: Towards Sensible
Patent Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 14-19 (2012). However, the initial validity
judgment is still persuasive precedent, and so as a practical matter a patent that has once
been found valid is likely to be found valid again. Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
919 F.2d 720, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The fact that the validity of those claims has
previously been upheld in an earlier litigation is also to be given weight, though not stare
decisis effect.”).
79
See Cotter, supra note 45, at 732.
80
See, e.g., VirnetX v. Cisco Sys, Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (making
this error); Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1255(Fed. Cir. 2013)
(same); LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 66 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(same); Finjan, Inc., v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(same); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same).
81
Id. at 2021 (discussing the effects of bargaining in the shadow of trial on licensing
behavior).
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own tail. Trial outcomes cannot depend on licenses if licenses depend on
trial outcomes.
Treating an existing licensing agreement as if it represents a true
valuation of a valid and infringed patent will force the patent into an
artificial downward spiral in value. A license will drive expected trial
outcomes lower, which will in turn drive future licenses lower, which will
in turn drive future expected trial outcomes even lower, and so forth. This
type of positive feedback loop is unsustainable and will lead to ever greater
distortions.
This spiral will result even if the patent is never litigated. It relies
only on parties correctly understanding how a court will behave and how it
will treat existing licenses. Consider the previous example, in which L1
agrees to license P’s patent for $5 million, with both parties calculating that
P is approximately 25% likely to succeed at trial and the court likely to
award $20 million in damages if P prevails. Suppose that P now approaches
L2 and threatens litigation if L2 does not agree to license the patent. If both P
and L2 understand that the court will use the licensing agreement between P
and L1 to set damages in the trial, then the two parties will recognize that L2
faces only $5 million in potential liability if it goes to trial. Accordingly, if
P is 25% likely to prevail at trial, L2 will agree to license the patent for
approximately $1.25 million.
Now suppose that P approaches L3 and again threatens litigation if
L3 does not agree to license the patent. What royalty can they be expected to
negotiate? There are now two existing licenses: the $5 million license
between P and L1 and the $1.25 million license between P and L2. Suppose
that L3, like L2 and L1, is 25% likely to be held liable for infringement in the
event of a trial. What liability would L3 face? If the court were (incorrectly)
treating existing licenses as indicative of a patent’s value, it would likely
assess damages in an amount between $1.25 million (the less expensive
license) and $5 million (the more expensive license). The midpoint of that
range—$3.125 million—is a reasonable estimate. If P and L3 understand
this fact, then they would likely negotiate a license for approximately 25%
of $3.125 million, or approximately $780,000. 82 As P negotiates with L1,
L2, and L3, the value of the patent has decreased from $5 million to $1.25
million to $780,000, all without the patent ever seeing the inside of a
courtroom. 83 The downward spiral is driven entirely by the parties’ belief
82

$781,250, to be exact.
These numbers are of course merely hypothetical; the precise metes and bounds of this
downward spiral will depend on the values at issue in any given case. The more general
point is that this decay in value will occur in any case in which the patent owner is less
than 100% certain to prevail. In practice, that means that it will occur in every case; no
patent owner can ever be completely assured of victory.
83
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that the court will improperly rely upon prior licenses as evidence of the
patent’s value. 84
As much as courts would like to rely upon market measures in
estimating damages, there is no reliable route out of this circularity. 85 The
reason is that patent licensing fees can only ever be grounded in a threat of
suit, and thus in the parties’ best estimate of what a court will force them to
pay. 86 There is simply no reason to license a patent other than to alleviate
the threat of suit. It is not as if any technology is actually being transferred
when a patent is licensed; the public patent document already discloses the
technology on its face, and a putative licensee can read the patent without
licensing it. 87 It is of course possible that the patent holder would transfer
technical knowledge along with a license for the patent, 88 and this latent
knowledge may well be more valuable than any technical information
disclosed by the patent itself. 89 But this transfer amounts to a provision of
valuable information and services above and beyond a license for the patent
itself. Courts have regularly refused to use licenses that involve a transfer of
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Of course, some scholars have theorized that licensing fees are already too high, driven
upward by the patent owner’s ability to obtain an injunction or courts’ own
miscalculations. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 2019 (analyzing various
dynamics that can lead to excessive licensing royalties and patent damages). Some might
suggest that the downward spiral caused by misuse of existing licenses is a necessary
corrective to this trend. This is not impossible, but it is highly unlikely. If the two effects
balance one another, it would be through sheer fortuity. No sound long-term legal regime
should rely on courts making two types of legal mistake, and hoping that each mistake
counteracts the other. It is far better to attempt to correct both mistakes. Here, that means
grappling with the problems of private information and circularity endemic to existing
licenses.
85
Contra Taylor, supra note 11, at 142–43 (suggesting that making certain assumptions
about infringement and validity offer a “partial solution” to this circularity). As this section
and the sections that follow will explain, there is no egress from this circularity. Indeed, it
is the circularity that renders insurmountable the problems created when courts base patent
damages on existing licenses.
86
See Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting
Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. Econ. 199, 200 (2001).
87
See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Mean Innovation?, at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2565292 (unpublished manuscript
2015) (surveying parties involved in patent licensing and finding that licenses rarely
involve the transfer of technical information).
88
See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503 (2012)
(describing the transfer of tacit information that often accompanies patents).
89
See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 532 (2012) (surveying scientists on their use of the information disclosed in
patents and finding that patents are less-than-perfect disclosure devices).
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more than just patent rights as a guide to patent damages in litigation. 90 This
is appropriate; if a patent licensing agreement simultaneously involves the
transfer of what amounts to a valuable trade secret, it cannot serve as a
reliable guide to pricing a patent license that involves no such transfer. 91
The point is that patent licenses are inherently parasitic on litigation:
without the threat of litigation, there would be no licensing. This is why it is
incoherent for courts to refuse to consider licenses negotiated during
litigation or the threat of litigation. Whether the courts realize it or not, there
is no other context in which licenses might arise. If licenses are parasitic
upon litigation, litigation cannot also rely upon licenses for guidance. At the
heart of judicial practice lies a conceptual impossibility.
What, then, is the “true” value of a patent? The problem, as I have
argued, is that there is no inherent value to the patent—it is worth only what
a court will force a party to pay. One possible way out of this quagmire is
that a patent is worth whatever price the parties would bargain to if the
court found the patent valid and infringed and awarded an injunction to the
patent holder. But this answer is both unhelpful in practice and untrue in
theory. As a theoretical matter, the prices that defendants pay to lift
injunctions often reflect holdup costs, assuming the defendants have already
invested in producing the infringing good. 92 These holdup costs are an
artifact of the plaintiff having the defendant over a barrel, not a true
measure of what the defendant would have paid before the infringement
began. And in practice, injunctions are sufficiently rare that it is unlikely
that a court will any to use as a model. What are the odds that a particular
patent plaintiff would have previously won a verdict against another
defendant, been granted an injunction, and then licensed the patent to the

90

ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 870 (“Dr. David based his damages on seven ResQNet
licenses, five of which had no relation to the claimed invention. These five re-branding or
re-bundling licenses . . . furnished finished software products and source code, as well as
services such as training, maintenance, marketing, and upgrades, to other software
companies in exchange for ongoing revenue-based royalties.”).
91
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(“Damages experts cannot use noncomparable licenses, with little relationship to the
claimed invention or parties-in-suit, as a basis for calculating reasonable royalties.”);
Axcess Int'l, Inc. v. Savi Technologies, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1033-F, 2013 WL 6839112, at
*8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2013) (“With regard to the non-comparable licensing agreements
analyzed by Dr. Hakala, the Court is of the opinion that they provide no assistance to his
analysis. The Federal Circuit has made clear that ‘[a]ny evidence unrelated to the claimed
invention does not support compensation for infringement but punishes beyond the reach of
the statute.’ ResQNet.com, Inc., 594 F.3d 869. Therefore, such analysis fails to ‘carefully
tie proof of damages to the claimed invention's footprint in the market place.’”).
92
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 65, at 2019 (analyzing various dynamics that can lead to
excessive licensing royalties and patent damages).
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defendant? Given the turn against injunctions—the point with which this
article begins—this circumstances must be very uncommon.
Accordingly, it makes sense to think of a patent’s value as whatever
a court would force a defendant to pay, absent any consideration of existing
licenses. That is to say, it is whatever figure a court would arrive at after
using the Georgia-Pacific factors other than the factors that direct a court to
consider existing license. These factors include “the nature and scope of the
license,” the “established profitability of the products,” the “utility and
advantages of [the patent] over old modes and devices,” “the extent to
which the infringer has made use of the invention and the value of such
use,” and so forth. 93 If courts rely upon these economic factors, and
licensing fees are based upon these court decisions, there is no circularity.
This is the only coherent and practical way to conceptualize the value of a
patent. The problem is that it is difficult for courts to estimate these
values—hence the desire for market measures in the first place.
Of course, the problem of circularity is not unique to patent law. At
a deep level, the value of goods and legal rights in the marketplace will
always depend to at least some degree on predicted outcomes in court.
Whenever a court uses a market transaction to value a good or a legal right,
the potential for circularity exists. This is most evident in negotiations over
a surplus, where there is no clear right or wrong answer. For instance, a
union and an employer bargaining over wages will sometimes agree to
submit the dispute to arbitration. In reaching a decision, the arbitrator will
look to agreements that similarly situated parties have reached in the past.
Those past agreements, in turn, will depend to at least some degree on what
the parties would have expected an arbitrator to decide. Private contracts
and arbitration decisions are locked in a circle. 94 (Other legal issues, such
as the standard of care in tort law, can similarly give rise to circularities. If
the standard of care depends on standard industry practices, and standard
industry practices depend on the level of care a court deems necessary, the
same type of circularity arises.)
In most cases, however, the influence of judicial decisions on
market values is very slight. Imagine a situation in which A steals B’s
bicycle and B sues A for compensation. If a court finds for B, it will
presumably look to the market price of the bicycle to determine the
appropriate compensation. At some very deep level, that market price could
93

Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. At 1119-20.
This can occur in other contractual contexts as well. See Jim Leitzel, Damage Measures
and Incomplete Contracts, 20 RAND J. Econ. 92 (1989) (suggesting that courts can create
a circularity if they use typical private reliance as a measure of reasonable reliance
damages, which in turn will influence the degree to which parties are willing to rely upon
promises).
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depend on a judicial decision. A putative bicycle purchaser might instead
consider stealing the bicycle and taking his chances in court. In reality,
though, bicycle ownership rights are backed by threat of injunction, or jail
time, or reputational sanctions, or any number of other factors beyond the
price a thief will be forced to pay. There is no real circularity.
Although the problem of circularity in valuation is not unique to
patent law, it is especially stark and critical in that context. Unlike most
other goods, the value of a patent depends entirely on its likely fate in court.
Courts, for their part, have emphasized their desire to rely upon existing
licenses to value patents whenever possible. The circularity problem thus
squarely infects a broad swath of patent cases.
C.

Contracts with Third-Party Effects

The use of existing licensing agreements to determine patent
damages raises another problem common to a wide variety of contracts that
affect the rights and duties of third parties: it creates incentives to
manipulate the value of the contract. Judicial use of licenses in valuing
patents rests on the notion that the patent is being negotiated at arm’s length
between two parties who are dividing a joint surplus. 95 That is, neither party
has any incentive to give the other side any consideration beyond what it is
due in the course of the negotiation. 96 In other words, for a license to be
reliable evidence, a court must believe that the parties are operating in good
faith and at arm’s length to value the patent. The reliability of the license
depends on the presumed behavior of the parties.
But in many contractual settings, including many patent licenses, the
two parties to the contract are not the only ones whose rights or interests
may be at issue. There is of course a well-known literature in the law of

95

Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d
1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Damages for patent infringement based on hypothetical
negotiation for reasonable royalty seeks to determine the terms of the license agreement the
parties would have reached had they negotiated at arms length when infringement began.”);
Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (“Two alternative categories of infringement compensation are
the patentee's lost profits and the reasonable royalty he would have received through armslength bargaining.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting
Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1147
(2013) (“Under patent law, a reasonable royalty normally is based on a hypothetical, armslength negotiation between a willing buyer and a willing seller that takes place at the time
the infringement begins.”).
96
This is also true as a general matter. Courts typically use recent sales, negotiated at arm’s
length, as an indication of fair market value, absent some reason to believe otherwise. See,
e.g., Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir. 2000).

24

MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES

24-Feb-15

contracts on third-party beneficiaries to contracts. 97 But the issue of third
parties arises with special force when a contract between A and B affects
how a court will value some property or service in future litigation between
A and a third party, C. For instance, imagine a contract between an
automobile owner A and insurer B. A contracts with B to insure A’s
automobile in the amount of $10,000 and pays a premium based upon that
amount. Under normal circumstances, A has no reason to insure the
automobile for more than it is worth (unless A plans to commit fraud). 98 The
greater A’s insured amount, the higher the premium that A must pay. 99 A
has no reason to pay a premium to purchase insurance greater than the
amount of loss that A will actually suffer. 100
Now suppose that A has reason to believe that A is likely to be
involved in an automobile accident in which the other driver is at fault.
(Perhaps A drives a substantial distance each day and has noticed a
significant number of reckless drivers along the route.) If A’s automobile is
wrecked in an accident with a third-party driver C, and C is at fault, C will
be liable to A for the value of the automobile. 101 A court might attempt to
assess that value independently, by scrutinizing the make, model, year and
97

13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37 (4th ed. 2010); 9-43 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 43
(2014); HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20 (2014); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1359 (1992); Robert S.
Adelson, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of One
Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875 (1985);.Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the
Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).
98
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L.
511, 523 (2006) (explaining that there is no reason to expend resources beyond the point at
which marginal costs exceed marginal benefits, and thus beyond the point at which there
would be insurance for more than the value of a loss).
99
Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law-A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 58
(2012); see also Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents:
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1917 n.27 (1995)
(explaining the manner in which premiums are typically calculated).
100
Of course, generally speaking an insurance company will not sell insurance worth more
than the replacement cost of property for fear of moral hazard. The concern is that the
insured will take less care now that she is insured—for instance, driving more recklessly—
particularly if she is insured for more than the value of the property. However, an insurance
company may not know the insured’s subjective valuation of the property. The insurer also
may not have information regarding defects to the property that lower its value. So it is
entirely possible that an insured party could end up with insurance greater than the value of
the property being insured.
101
Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007); Christopher Curran, The Spread of
the Comparative Negligence Rule in the United States, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 322
(1992) (“While there are exceptions to the rule, in general, under comparative negligence
the courts use the degree of negligence of the parties to an accident to determine the
percentage of the costs of the accidents each party will pay.”).
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prior condition of the automobile, but that task could be complicated
because the automobile is now in pieces. Alternatively, the court might
attempt to value the automobile by looking to the value of the insurance
agreement between A and B.
This creates an incentive for A to insure the automobile for more
than it is worth. If the automobile is worth only $8000 to A, but the court
assigns it a value of $10,000 because A has contracted for insurance in that
amount, A will pocket a profit of $2000 after C totals A’s car. Accordingly,
depending upon the additional premium that A must pay to insure the
automobile for $10,000 rather than $8000, and depending upon A’s
perception of the probability that the automobile will be damaged by a third
party, A may have an entirely rational reason for insuring the automobile for
more than it is worth.102 In essence, A can use the contract with B (the
insurer) to artificially inflate the perceived value of the automobile,
anticipating that a third party (C) will later be forced to make a payment
based upon that inflated value.
The litigation related to the attacks on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, offers an example of how these incentives might
operate. 103 In July of 2001, a real estate developer (World Trade Center
Properties, or “WTCP”) leased the Trade Center from its owner, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, for approximately $2.8 billion.104
When the towers were brought down by terrorists using airplanes as
weapons, WTCP sued the airlines for negligence, arguing that the terrorists
would not have been able to take control of the airplanes had the airlines
taken reasonable care in securing them against hijackers. 105 The court held
that the fair measure of the Trade Center’s market value was the lease that
WTCP had just signed with the Port Authority—$2.8 billion.106 As the
Trade Center’s replacement cost was much higher, this was the full
recovery to which the WTCP would be entitled. 107 Here, as in the
hypothetical example above, the court relied upon the arm’s length bargain
102

For instance, suppose that A must pay an additional $10 per year to insure the
automobile for $10,000 instead of $8000, but A believes there is a 1% chance that she will
be in an accident that is the fault of the other driver. By insuring her automobile for
$10,000 instead of $8000, A must pay an additional $10/year but stands to gain in
expectation $2000 × 0.01 = $20/year. This creates an incentive for A to purchase more
insurance for her car than it is worth.
103
In re September 11th Litigation, 590 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
104
Id. at 536.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 540-44. New York law, which governed the case, provided that a tort plaintiff
whose property was damaged was entitled to the lesser of (1) the property’s market value,
or (2) its replacement cost. Id. at 541 (citing Hartshorn v. Chaddock, 31 N.E. 997, 998
(1892)).
107
Id. at 541.
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between WTCP and the Port Authority to establish the market value of the
Trade Center. As the court explained, “Generally, a recent sale price for the
subject asset, negotiated by the parties at arm’s length, is the best evidence
of its market value.” 108
When it signed the lease with the Port Authority, the WTCP
undoubtedly understood that a court would look to that lease to estimate the
value of the Trade Center if it was damaged by a tort. The WTCP thus had
an incentive to artificially inflate the rental price. The Trade Center had
already once been subjected to a terrorist attack, and the WTCP insured the
buildings for over $3.5 billion against any damage, including damage from
a terrorist act. 109 Of course, it would not have made sense for the WTCP
simply to pay a higher price for additional insurance. There was only some
small probability that the Trade Center would be damaged by a third party
(who could then be made to pay), and so each additional dollar that it paid
to the Port Authority would likely lead to only a few additional cents of
recovery.
But the price is rarely the only term in a contract. The lease may
have committed the Port Authority to provide related services, or financing
for the lessor, or any number of other benefits. The WTCP thus could have
arranged to purchase other positive terms in the lease for a higher lease
price, figuring that it had a chance to recoup the higher price if the WTCP
was damaged by a third party in tort. For instance, there might be some
other contract term that the Port Authority would be willing to provide for
$100 million and that WTCP would value at $98 million. It would be
inefficient for the parties to agree to this term. But if the WTCP believed
that there was a 3% chance that the Trade Center would be damaged or
destroyed in a tortious action, then it would have an incentive to agree to the
term because it could recoup 3% of the cost: ($100 million × 3%) + $98
million = $101 million, which is greater than $100 million. The implication
is that using market agreements between two parties to assess tort damages
upon a third party can lead to inefficient behavior by the two contracting
parties, not just the third-party tortfeasor.
These examples may seem far-fetched in the context of automobile
insurance, where most policies do not offer the car’s owner the opportunity
to specify an insured amount, or the World Trade Center, where an act of
terrorism may seem too unlikely to affect behavior. 110 But its applicability
108

Id. at 546-47 (citing and quoting Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d
Cir.2000)).
109
Id. at 538-39.
110
See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Damages for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 771,
821-24 (1982) (suggesting that insured parties will not use insurance contracts strategically
where the likelihood of a triggering event is low).
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to patent law is much more straightforward. When a patent holder P agrees
to license a patent to a licensee L1, it must anticipate that this license will be
used to set damages in any future litigation between P and future licensees
L2 or L3. Accordingly, P has an incentive to drive the price it sets with L1 as
high as it possibly can.
How would P go about this? As a first step, it might engage in hard
bargaining, refusing to license the patent for a reasonable amount. The
social cost is that licensing agreements might become much less common if
patent holders refuse to license their IP for reasonable sums that
approximate expected trial outcomes. The result could be a decrease in
licensing and an increase in socially costly trials.
An alternative would be for P to package a patent license with other
valuable inducements in order to obtain a higher price. The typical patent
license includes just two terms: a royalty payment, and a license for the
patent for a period of years. 111 Yet this need not necessarily be the case. Just
as the WTCP might have obtained more favorable loan terms or any
number of other contractual benefits in exchange for a higher lease price, P
might provide subsidiary benefits—in addition to the patent license itself—
in exchange for greater royalties. P could offer to share technical
information with L1, or make available its employees to assist L1 in utilizing
the patented technology, 112 or promise L1 a discount on future patent
licenses, or package the patent license with a trademark license or other
intellectual property, or any number of other inducements. Even if P is
effectively “selling” the good or service for less than it is worth (if L1 will
not take it for full value), the exchange is still worthwhile for P if it will
increase the royalties it might eventually receive from L2 or L3.
P might also negotiate a license in which it absolves L1 of
responsibility for all past and future infringement while appearing to be
selling a license only for a portion of that time period. 113 For instance,
suppose that L1 has sold 1 million allegedly infringing units of a product
and intends to sell 1 million more. Imagine that P and L1 agree upon a
royalty of $1 per unit. P could offer L1 a blanket license for a lump sum
payment of $1.5 million, which represents a discount of $500,000 compared
with what L1 might have expected to have paid. P could then structure the
license so that it only references L1’s future conduct, making it appear as if
L1 is actually paying a royalty rate of $1.50 per unit.
111

See Simple Patent Licenses, 3 ECKSTROM'S LICENSING - FORMS § 5:1 (“There is
undoubtedly a large number of naked patent licenses regularly granted which are
unaccompanied by rights to use other forms of intellectual property.”).
112
See Lee, supra note 88, at 1505 (arguing that patent license can facilitate this type of
knowledge transfer).
113
See Keele, supra note 11, at 228 (describing a similar type of arrangement).
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These concerns are not hypothetical. For instance, in Ericsson v.
InterDigital, 114 a third party (Nokia) accused InterDigital of artificially
inflating the value of its patents in order to drive up the licensing price that
Nokia would be required to pay. InterDigital had agreed to license patents
to Nokia for a price based in part on what other firms would pay
InterDigital to license the same patents. 115 InterDigital then succeeded in
negotiating a lucrative license with Ericsson and demanded a substantial
payment from Nokia. Nokia, in return, accused InterDigital of artificially
inflating the value of its license with Ericsson. This example is perhaps
more acute than the typical case in which licenses are used to compute
damages because the price of Nokia’s license depended directly on the
agreement between InterDigital and Ericsson. Nonetheless, the same types
of concerns pervade both situations.
Because of these concerns, courts generally do their best to prevent
these types of arrangements from infecting license-based valuations. If a
patent license includes additional benefits—above and beyond a simple
license to the patent—courts typically refuse to treat the license as evidence
of a reasonable royalty. 116 As noted above, this is entirely appropriate in the
context of litigation damages where the only benefit “purchased” by the
defendant is a license to use the patent. P might still attempt to hide the
other terms of the deal, describing the royalty rate in one document and
leaving the other inducements for a separate document or no document at
all. If it were later discovered that a license relied upon by the court
contained other, unstated terms, it might be possible to reopen the damages
judgment based on fraud on the court. Nonetheless, it will be incumbent
upon courts and parties to remain vigilant in policing these types of
behaviors. As courts rely more and more upon licenses for measuring
reasonable royalties, patent owners will have incentives to inflate licensing
prices and then attempt to obscure or conceal that inflation by any means
available to them.
It is worth noting that the effects detailed in this section and in
section II.A push in opposite directions. Because licenses are necessarily
probabilistic calculations of expected trial outcomes—with victory for the
patent holder uncertain—they will tend to depress damages calculations at
trial. At the same time, patentees have an incentive to inflate the price of
licensing agreements, even at the expense of inefficient transactions, which
will tend to increase damages calculations at trial. It may be tempting to
conclude that these effects will balance one another out, or at least come
close enough to doing so that it is safe to ignore them. But this would be
114

418 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1220.
116
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
115
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error. It would be pure fortuity if the two effects negated one another, and
there is no reason to expect that they would. Moreover, the price distortion
from the former effect—the fact that licenses represent settlement of
uncertain patent claims—will likely dwarf any distortion that patentees can
introduce by inflating license prices. If a given patent is only 50% likely to
be valid and infringed—which may if anything be an overestimate of the
patent’s probability of success—then the licensing price for the patent will
be discounted by 50%. It seems unlikely that a patent holder could inflate
the licensing price of a patent through contract to the same degree.
Nonetheless, any type of contractual manipulation is harmful both for the
mispricing it can cause, and for the social waste and rent-seeking it
generates.

IV.

A WAY FORWARD?

The question that remains is whether there exists a solution to the
problems described above. Is there a mechanism by which courts can render
patent licenses a useful guide to calculating reasonable royalty damages? It
is on this issue that courts and commentators have floundered. This Part
takes up the challenge of finding such a solution.
A.

The Selection of Licenses

As an initial step, courts should attempt to select those licenses that
provide the most accurate estimate of damages. The dollar value of a license
(roughly) represents the underlying value of the patent discounted by the
probability that the patent will be found invalid or not infringed at trial. If
the parties believe that there is only a 10% chance that a court will find the
patent valid and infringed, the license value will be 10% of the patent’s
underlying value—which is what the court is attempting to discover. 117 If
the parties believe that there is a 50% chance that a court will find the patent
valid and infringed, then the parties will agree to license the patent for 50%
of the patent’s underlying value. Accordingly, the most accurate gauge of a
patent’s value will be provided by licenses negotiated by parties who agreed
that a patent was 100% likely to be found valid and infringed. If the parties
had no doubt as to the expected outcome at trial, then they would likely
have negotiated a licensing amount approximately equivalent to d—the
expected damages at trial, and the value that the court is seeking to
discover. More generally, the greater the probability that the patent owner
would prevail at trial (per the beliefs of the parties to a licensing
117

See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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negotiation), the closer the value of the license to the “true” value of the
patent, and the greater the weight that license should be afforded by a court
when assessing damages.
In many cases, this means licenses negotiated as litigation
settlements will be more accurate and more useful gauges of patent value
than licenses negotiated outside of litigation. In particular, the most reliable
indicator of value will be a license negotiated in the course of a trial that the
patent owner was winning, or (better yet) winning handily. 118 The closer the
plaintiff is to being 100% certain of prevailing, the more accurate the value
of the license. 119 Courts should thus look for licenses that were negotiated
under circumstances that were highly unfavorable to the defendant. If the
defendant has received an unfavorable claim construction ruling, 120 or had
its invalidity defenses thrown out on summary judgment, 121 and elects to
settle, it is safe to assume that the plaintiff and defendant believe it is highly
probable that the patent will be found valid and infringed—and surely more
probable than they did before the trial started. A defendant who is losing at
trial will often see the writing on the wall and settle the case for close to the
patent’s full value. 122 To be clear, the point is comparative: if courts must
use existing licenses, they are better off with licenses negotiated when the
defendant was losing at trial.
Recall the issue in LaserDynamics, described in Part I: the parties
introduced twenty-nine licenses into evidence, twenty-eight of which were
for amounts of $1 million or less, and one of which—the BenQ
settlement—was for $6 million.123 The BenQ settlement was negotiated as
an end to a trial in which the defendant had already been repeatedly
sanctioned, faced a stark disadvantage at trial, and was very likely to
lose. 124 The BenQ license was thus an extreme outlier—and of all the
licenses in evidence, it was the one that most accurately captured the value
118
For the purposes of using a license to indicate the value of a patent, it does not matter
why the patent owner is winning the case. All that matters is that the parties believe it is
very likely that the patent will be held valid and infringed. The one exception is if the
defendant is at risk of being forced to pay treble damages for willful infringement. See
Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 435, 438 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The threat of
treble damages would distort the licensing price.
119
See id.
120
Claim construction is the process by which a court interprets or construes the claim
terms in a patent. See Markman v. Westview, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (outlining the procedure
for courts to construe claims).
121
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (describing the various bases upon which a
defendant might argue that a patent is invalid).
122
See Posner, supra note 27, at 406 (analyzing bargaining dynamics within trial).
123
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 57–58 (Fed Cir. 2012)
124
Id. at 58 (“The district court had allotted BenQ one-third less time than Mr. Kamatani
for voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument . . . .”).
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of the patent. This is precisely because BenQ was so likely to lose at trial.
Six million dollars is the amount that a defendant was willing to pay
LaserDynamics when it seemed certain that it would lose at trial and be
made to pay one way or another; $1 million (or less) was the amount that
licensees were willing to pay when there was some substantial likelihood
that they would prevail if it came to a trial. The LaserDynamics court
should have adopted exactly the opposite posture: it should have treated the
BenQ settlement as its guiding star and relegated the other twenty-eight
licenses to secondary status. It is in this respect that the courts’ approach to
using licenses to assess patent damages is not merely incoherent, but
backwards.
Of course, licenses negotiated as settlements to trial will not always
provide more accurate guides than licenses negotiated outside of trial. The
probability of prevailing at trial, even against the same patent owner, can
differ widely from licensee to licensee. This is primarily because they may
be selling different products with different probabilities of infringing the
patent. 125 There may be cases in which a license negotiated outside of
litigation provides the most accurate guide to patent value because that
licensee happens to believe it has the lowest probability of success at trial.
But in the aggregate, the licenses that provide the most accurate indications
of value will be those negotiated in the midst of trials that were going well
for the plaintiffs and poorly for the defendants.
This is why courts’ and commentators’ hostility toward litigation
settlements as a gauge of patent damages is not just misguided but
backward. 126 In refusing to consider licenses negotiated during litigation,
courts have ignored not merely a useful source of information, but in many
cases the most useful source of information. Of course, that is not to say that
licenses negotiated in litigation will necessarily be terribly useful,
particularly when the licensee was not faring poorly. These licenses still
represent only floors to a patent’s value, not accurate point estimates. But in
many cases the courts will have no better options.
B.

An Estimated Multiplier

Another solution would be for the court assessing damages to apply
a multiplier to an existing license. If a court concludes that the parties to an
existing license believed there was a 25% probability that the patent was
valid and infringed, it could simply multiply the license value fourfold and
125

If the patent is invalid, it is invalid with respect to all potential infringers. Greene, supra
note 78, at 5-7. But some putative infringers might make products that almost certainly
infringe, while others might manufacture products that are highly unlikely to do so.
126
See sources cited in supra notes 46-47.

32

MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES

24-Feb-15

assess damages in that amount. 127 This solution seems promising (and
simple) at first glance, but it runs immediately into the problem of private
information that permeates this issue. The court needs to know how the
parties to the license perceived the strength of the patent—what
probabilities did they assign to validity and infringement? 128 The only truly
reliable information on this question is in the possession of the parties to the
license themselves, and it is very unlikely that the court could ever discover
this information. In most cases what information that exists will be
protected by attorney-client privilege. 129 If a licensing party formed a belief
about the probability of invalidity or infringement, it likely did so in the
context of a communication with its lawyers. Even where the relevant
information is discoverable, there may be no written record; the court would
need to rely upon the testimony of the parties. And of course the patent
owner has no reason to testify honestly and nothing to prevent it from
artificially inflating the patent’s value.
In the alternative, a court might seek objective indications of the
probabilities that underlay an existing license. When the parties present
expert evidence on damages, their experts might include estimates of the ex
ante probability that a patent would be found valid and infringed—in other
words, the expert’s best guess as to the parties’ beliefs, at the time the
license was negotiated, of the probability that the patent owner would
prevail at trial. 130 (Or, for that matter, the court might hire its own expert or
special master to provide an independent evaluation of the same
question. 131) In essence, the court would be constructing a miniature trial on
the merits of the prior license, attempting to reconstruct the terms of the
bargain that the parties intended. Indeed, it appears that some patent
127

See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 643 (2010) (proposing a structured
method by which courts might calculate patent royalty damages); Taylor, supra note 11, at
131 (suggesting that “adjustments” be made to license values, without specifying what
those adjustments might be); Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 11, at 797. None of these
scholars recognizes or analyzes the advantages and problems involved in such an approach
as detailed in this section.
128
See supra Part II.A.
129
See Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974) (defining and
describing the scope of the attorney-client privilege); In re Revastigmine Patent Litigation,
237 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); see also John Dragseth, Note, Coerced Waiver of
the Attorney-Client Privilege for Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 167 (1995) (analyzing situations in which parties can be forced to disclose otherwise
privileged information).
130
Cf. Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (discussing the role that damages expert play in
establishing reasonable royalty damages at trial).
131
This practice is relatively rare, but it does occur on occasion. One instance was the
Apple v. Motorola litigation before Judge Posner. See id. (discussing the court’s use of an
independent damages expert); see also FED. R. EVID. 706.
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damages experts have begun suggesting multipliers in their expert
reports. 132 In theory, courts could draw upon experts’ recommendations and
attempt to calculate multipliers to license values.
Yet there are (at least) four significant problems with this approach.
The first is that it involves using objective information to answer a
fundamentally subjective question. When an expert attempts to assess the
likelihood that a patent would have been held valid and infringed in a prior
litigation, the expert must endeavor to determine the parties’ perceptions of
the patent’s strength at the time the license was negotiated. But there is no
reason to believe that this expert’s guess will hit anywhere close to the
mark. The expert might discover important prior art that the licensee could
not find; or the expert might miss important prior art that the licensee
possessed. 133 Similarly, the expert might have at her disposal a set of
arguments that the prior licensee did not, or lack some legal theory that the
prior licensee viewed as critical. Using an expert to estimate a prior
licensee’s view of its prospects at trial rests on a grand assumption: the
expert will have access to the same evidence and the same legal arguments
as the prior licensee. It is of course possible that this assumption will hold in
one case or another, but there is little reason to believe that it will be
consistently true. After all, the damages expert is operating at the end of a
full trial on the merits, during which the parties have presumably produced
every significant piece of evidence and argument available. 134 The prior
license might have been negotiated well before any trial, after much less
investigation and study.
The second problem is that the prior licensing negotiation involved
private information that an expert in a later case cannot access.. The
infringement issues in the instant case might differ dramatically from the
infringement question that confronted the parties to the earlier license. The
prior licensee (L1) might have been producing a very different product from
132

However, reported cases in which experts are even permitted to testify in favor of
multipliers are few and far between. Compare Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 2417367, at *7 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011) (allowing
an expert to testify that an existing royalty should be tripled) with Avocent Redmond Corp.
v. Rose Electronics, 2013 WL 1890007 (W.D. Wash.) (“This Court correctly prohibited Dr.
Kerr from arbitrarily trebling his proffered royalty based on a generic 33% litigation
success rate.”).
133
Prior art is any information in the public domain that predates the patented invention. A
patent can be invalidated as obvious or not novel on the basis of prior art. Robert Patrick
Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 42-49 (6th
ed. 2013).
134
See Timothy Flynn, Jr., On "Borrowed Wits": A Proposed Rule for Attorney
Depositions, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1956, 1962 (1993) (“The second fundamental justification
offered for the adversary model is that its incentive structure makes it the best system for
eliciting truth.”).
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the product that was at issue in the current litigation between the patent
owner (P) and the new putative infringer (L2). Moreover, with respect to the
prior license, L1 might be in possession of critical information related to
infringement. After all, it was L1’s product that was alleged to infringe the
patent. L2 may have difficult accessing this private information; L1 is not a
party to the lawsuit and can be served only with certain types of
discovery. 135 And without that information, L2’s expert can only guess at
the probability that L1 would have been found to infringe.
The third problem with attempting to estimate a multiplier for a
prior license is that it forces the parties to make arguments during the
damages phase of the trial that directly contradict the arguments they made
during the liability phase. The defendant will argue that the court should
apply a low multiple—perhaps a multiple of 1—to the prior license when
calculating damages. In other words, the defendant will argue that when P
licensed the patent to L1, it was a near-certainty that the patent was valid
and infringed. This follows a trial in which the defendant argued precisely
the contrary (particularly with respect to invalidity). The patent owner (P),
for its part, would argue for a high multiple, claiming that when it
negotiated with L1 it was doubtful that a court would find the patent valid
and infringed. The patent owner has of course just spent the entire trial
arguing the opposite: that the patent is obviously valid and infringed.
Accordingly, both parties would find themselves trying to proffer
arguments that they are likely estopped from raising due to positions they
had taken earlier in the litigation. 136 The result would be an awkward mess
for the court. To be sure, these conflicts between the liability and damages
phases might limit the sorts of outlandish claims the parties might try to
make. But while that might be a good mechanism for reaching a moderate
result, it will not necessarily lead to an accurate one. 137
Finally, even if the parties’ experts manage to produce insightful and
accurate estimates of the licensing multiple, the court will likely misuse or
even ignore them. Consider the point at trial at which this issue will arise.
The judge and jury have just completed a trial in which the patent was
found to be valid and infringed. They are now being asked to find—
135

Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (allowing depositions of nonparties) with FED. R. CIV. P.
33, 35, 36 (barring interrogatories and other types of discovery directed at nonparties) and
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (permitting document requests directed at nonparties only with leave of
the court).
136
Teledyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1990) (analyzing and describing
judicial, equitable, and collateral estoppel).
137
This particular problem could be avoided if the court simply appointed its own expert.
But then the court would lose the benefit of the adversarial process and the high-powered
incentives it creates. There is no guarantee that the court’s expert will obtain all of the most
relevant evidence or raise the most important arguments on either side.
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contrary to what they have just decided—that there was a significant ex ante
probability that they would have reached the opposite decision. This is an
implausible mental task for nearly anyone, including judges. 138 People too
often fall prey to motivated reasoning—the tendency to believe selectively
those facts and arguments that support their prior conclusions and
dispositions.139 Any judge or juror would be very hard-pressed to give a fair
hearing to an expert who claims that their decision was less than 100%
foreordained. Inevitably, then, courts and juries will consistently
underestimate the appropriate multiplier to apply. In many cases they will
ignore the need for a multiplier entirely. It is for this reason that no court
has ever applied or even discussed the use of a multiplier in a published
opinion, even though many have discussed the use of licenses to set
reasonable royalty damages. 140
C.

A Standard Multiplier

Instead of attempting to calculate a multiplier for any given license
or case, courts could instead apply a standard, constant multiplier to all
licenses across all cases. For instance, patent plaintiffs prevail in
approximately 25% of all patent cases. 141 If we assume, as a very rough cut,
that any given patent owner has a 25% chance ex ante of prevailing against
any given alleged infringer, 142 then the appropriate multiplier is four.143
Courts have thus far appeared resistant to using a standard multiplier, but on

138

Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III's Jury Trial Provision,
Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 455
(2012); Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 653 (1999); Ziva Kunda, The Case for
Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
139
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2014); see also Eric A. Posner & Cass
R.
Sunstein,
Institutional
Flip-Flops
(unpublished
manuscript
2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2553285
(discussing
motivated
reasoning in the context of institutional questions).
140
See supra Part I.
141
Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW, (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed.) (2012).
142
This is of course an entirely heroic assumption. It is highly possible that the probability
of prevailing against a party that eventually agreed to license a patent diverges substantially
from the actual probability of prevailing at trial, due to selection effects. The point is not to
arrive at the perfect number, but just to find a rough and ready estimate that can be
deployed across cases. As the discussion will demonstrate, there are substantial problems
that accompany even this use of a rough number that go beyond any question of accuracy
of what that number should precisely be.
143
1 / 0.25 = 4.
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the grounds that it lacks a connection to the case at bar. 144 However, that is
precisely the advantage of such an approach. The use of a standard
multiplier would free courts and experts from the informational problems
described above. It would also eliminate the concern that judges and juries
would underestimate the appropriate multiplier due to motivated
reasoning. 145
The use of a standard multiplier would create problems, though.
Even if the standard multiplier is correct in the aggregate, in the sense that
the average license involves a patent that was 25% likely to be found valid
and infringed, it will still overcompensate and undercompensate most patent
holders. If the proper multiplier for a license is greater than four, the
standard multiplier will undercompensate the owner of that patent if it
prevails at trial. If the proper multiplier is less than four, the standard
multiplier will overcompensate the patent owner. The patent owner will be
properly compensated only in the rare case where the particular licensed
patent was exactly 25% likely to be found valid and infringed at trial. Under
normal circumstances, this type of systematic overcompensation and
undercompensation would be a problem. 146 After all, it is not the aggregate
outcome that matters. If certain types of inventors are being systematically
undercompensated, they may reduce their investments in research and
development. And if other inventors are being systematically
overcompensated, they might engage in socially wasteful expenditures in
order to acquire more patents. Wastefully high levels of resources will flow
to the types of inventions that are being overcompensated, leaving other
types of innovation underfunded.
However, in this context, the overcompensation and
undercompensation may turn out to be a feature, rather than a bug. The
reason is that the patent owners who will be undercompensated are those
who succeeded in licensing patents with a low probability of winning at
trial. For instance, if a patent owner (P) and licensee (L1) agree that there is
only a 10% chance that the patent will be found valid and infringed, they
will discount the licensing price by a factor of 10. If P eventually prevails
against a subsequent licensee (L2) at trial, the proper multiplier would be 10.
A standard multiplier of 4 would undercompensate this patent holder. By
contrast, the patent owners who will be overcompensated are those who
licensed patents with a high probability of winning at trial. If P and L1 had
144

See, e.g., Avocent, 2013 WL 1890007 (prohibiting an expert from testifying in favor of
a standard multiplier).
145
See supra Part III.B.
146
Cf. Anthony Niblett, Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law, 42 J. LEG.
STUD. 303, 304-06 (2013) (explaining, in the context of judging, that two extreme judges
will not cancel one another out but will instead likely produce extreme law).
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agreed that the patent was 75% likely to be found valid and infringed, the
appropriate multiplier (in the P v. L2 trial) would be 4/3 or approximately
1.33. A multiplier of 4 would overcompensate P.
This means that parties with strong patents who assert good claims
will be overcompensated, while parties with dubious patents who assert
weak claims will be undercompensated. From a social perspective, this is
desirable. A standard multiplier will dissuade patent owners from
demanding licenses where they have only a weak claim to validity and
infringement, potentially curbing some of the worst abuses perpetrated by
so-called patent “trolls.” 147 At the same time, a standard multiplier will
reward parties with strong patents who pursue only obviously infringing
parties. This may be unnecessary, as those types of patent owners are likely
to be rewarded regardless, but it is probably not especially harmful.148
Accordingly, at least at first glance, this approach has much to recommend
it.
Yet there is a significant problem with using a standard multiplier.
The problem lies with the circularity of using licenses to calculate trial
damages and vice versa, and the positive feedback loop that it creates.
Suppose that P is the owner of a strong patent that has never been litigated
or licensed. P demands that L1 license the patent, and the parties agree that
the patent is 75% likely to be found valid and infringed. The parties further
agree that a court would likely award $10 million in damages if P prevailed.
They agree that L1 will license the patent for $7.5 million.149 Now P
approaches L2—who is selling a product similar to L1’s—and demands that
L2 license the patent. The parties agree that the patent is 75% likely to be
found valid and infringed if the case were to go to trial. But in light of the
license between P and L1, the parties realize that if P were to prevail at trial,
the court might well award $30 million in damages—the $7.5 million
license between P and L1, adjusted upward by a multiple of 4. 150 Facing a
75% chance of incurring a damages verdict of $30 million, L2 will be forced
to pay $22.5 million for a license, vastly more than L1. And then, if P were
147

See, e.g., T. Christian Landreth, The Fight Against “Patent Trolls:” Will State Law
Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 100 (2014) (describing the practice of
sending demand letters to entities that are likely not infringing in the hope of negotiating
small settlements).
148
See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO.
L.J. 637 (2013) (arguing that it makes economic sense to over-reward winning patent
litigants in order to compensate them for the possibility that a court might have errantly
invalidated their patents).
149
$10 million × 0.75 = $7.5 million.
150
More conservatively, the court might award damages in the amount of $20 million,
which is halfway between the $10 million figure that the court might calculate with the
help of experts, and $30 million, which the license would dictate. The effect on subsequent
licenses would be the same; the magnitude would just be slightly smaller.
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to demand a license from a third putative infringer L3, the upward spiral in
value will continue. The result will be vast overcompensation of P. While
some modest degree of overcompensation might not be problematic, an
uncontrolled upward spiral in the value of the patent would almost surely
lead to wasteful diversion of resources. 151
The same sort of spiral will occur, though in the downward
direction, with respect to weaker patents. Suppose P demands that L1
license a patent that both parties agree is 10% likely to be found valid and
infringed at trial. The parties further agree that a court would likely award
$10 million in damages if P prevailed. L1 thus agrees to license the patent
for $1 million. P then approaches a similarly situated L2, and the parties
agree that there is a 10% probability that the patent would be found valid
and infringed at trial. Now, however, L2 is facing potential liability of only
$4 million if it litigates and loses at trial, because of the license between P
and L1.152 Accordingly, L2 will be willing to license the patent for only
$400,000. Just as the value of a strong patent will spiral upward, the value
of a weaker patent will spiral downward.
Put more formally, any time the standard multiplier M is greater
than 1 / p (the inverse of the plaintiff’s probability of success at trial), it will
create an upward spiral in value. Any time M < 1 / p, the standard multiplier
will create a downward spiral in value. Only when M happens to be chosen
perfectly—that is, M = 1 / p—will this spiral not develop.
Again, in and of itself this is not necessarily a decisive problem; it
might be appropriate to undercompensate parties who assert weaker
patents. 153 But it could create harmful incentives and lead to other types of
wasteful behavior. For instance, if P has a weak case against L1 but knows
that any settlement it reaches will harm it in future cases, it might choose to
litigate rather than settle. 154 This could lead to wasteful litigation
expenditures and social costs. Alternatively, P and L1 might engage in other
types of socially wasteful behavior in an attempt to obscure the value of the
license or render it inapplicable to future cases. For instance, P might
bundle the patent license with other goods that L1 neither wants nor needs,

151

See Malani & Masur, supra note 148, at 652 (explaining the social harm that can be
caused by dramatic overcompensation of patent owners, even when their patents are valid
and infringed).
152
Again, the court might settle on a value somewhere between $4 million and $10 million.
Regardless, the effect will be the same; only the magnitude of the effect will differ.
153
See Malani & Masur, supra note 148, at 657 (analyzing the effects of undercompensation on patent owners).
154
On the other hand, P faces the risk that its patent would be invalidated at trial. But if P
has a valid patent, and the weakness in its case is that L1 may not be infringing, then it has
strong reasons to proceed to trial rather than allowing L1 to negotiate a license.

17-June-15

MISUSE OF PATENT LICENSES

39

such as trademarks or tacit knowledge. 155 The result would be to eliminate
the license as a useful measure of patent value, using an inefficient and
socially wasteful transaction.
The upshot is that while the static overcompensation and
undercompensation caused by using a standard license multiple might be
harmless or even desirable, the dynamic overcompensation and
undercompensation that results from feedback between licensing and trial
will be harmful. This speaks to the insuperable nature of the difficulties
generated from the licensing-litigation circularity. 156 Without some
mechanism for breaking this circularity, dynamic under and
overcompensation will frustrate any attempt to use licenses as a reliable
measure of patent damages over time. 157 The prospects for finding a true
market measure of patent value do not seem promising. 158

CONCLUSION
Courts inevitably struggle to assess reasonable royalty damages, and
it is only natural that they would turn to market-based measures such as
existing licenses. However, courts’ attempts to use these licenses to
determine patent damages at trial are frustrated by three problems.
Calculating the underlying value of the patent from an existing license
requires private information that the court cannot access; doing so involves
155

See Lee, supra note 88, at 1507 (describing such transfers).
See supra Part II.B.
157
It is extremely common for a patent holder to approach multiple parties sequentially and
demand licenses. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 58 (noting that there were 29
licenses on record). The dynamic problems caused by licensing-litigation circularity are
likely to exist across a broad swath of the relevant patents.
158
There are even more imaginative possibilities. One, which is suggested by recent work
by Sarah and Michael Abramowicz, would be to force parties to negotiate each element of
a settlement separately and sequentially, without comingling the separate issues. Sarah
Abramowicz & Michael Abramowicz, Severing Settlements (unpublished manuscript
2015), on file with author. In the patent context, Congress could require patent owners and
licensees to negotiate damages and probability of infringement separately. That is, instead
of the two parties simply settling on a royalty, they would first negotiate the damages
money they expect the court to assess against the defendant in the event the patent was
found valid and infringed. They would then negotiate the probability that the patent would
in fact be found valid and infringed at trial. The result would be a license that actually
contained information regarding the parties’ view of the economic value of the patent. The
problem with this arrangement is the immense incentive to cheat; both parties would
benefit from agreeing to an inflated damages figure and a reduced probability.
Accordingly, this proposal may not be easily imported to patent law. Nonetheless, similar
types of revelation mechanisms could hold promise as means of placing market values on
patents, and they are a fruitful subject for future study.
156
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a circularity that is difficult to evade; and parties to a license have
incentives to distort the value of that license in order to affect future
proceedings. There are various correctives that a court can employ,
including selecting the most information-rich licenses and applying a
multiplier to license values where appropriate. But even these measures
have limited efficacy.
It is in the nature of legal scholarship to write comedies, rather than
tragedies. 159 Each legal problem should be accompanied by a clever (and
preferably plausible) solution. But it does not seem that this story is meant
to end well. Finding an accurate measure of patent damages is critical, and
never more so than right now, as patents assume an ever more important
role in the legal landscape and damages take center stage. But existing
licenses cannot provide a useful guide to the value of a patent, only the bare
minimum of a valuation floor. Courts have no choice but to muddle through
technical analysis and expert reports per the remaining Georgia-Pacific
factors. There is no reliable substitute, and no other way to make sense of
the “true” value of a patent without creating a circularity. It is unfortunate
that courts will not be able to draw upon market indications of value, but
sometimes no guidance is better than guidance that can only lead astray.

159

To my knowledge, Tom Miles was the first to offer this observation.
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